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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK DENIED A MOTION TO VACATE A RULE B ATTACHMENT BECAUSE THE
UNDERLYING CLAIM WAS VALID UNDER ENGLISH LAW . .
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied a
motion to vacate an attachment based on English law and equity. Despite the
imding of a valid equitable assignment of rights to payment based upon a charterer
under English law, the requirement that such assignment be made in the ordinary
course of business rendered the assignment void for purposes of attachment.

ST Shipping and Transport, Inc. v. Golden Fleece Maritime, Inc.
United States District Court for the Southern District ofNew York
2008 A.M.C. 2640
(Decided September 9, 2008)
On May 30, 2003, ST Shipping and Transport, Inc. ("ST Shipping") chartered the MIT ELLI,
owned by Golden Fleece Maritime, Inc. ("Golden Fleece") for a period of six months. Clauses in the
charter stated that ( 1 ) Golden Fleece be charged with the maintenance or restoration of the ship's ability
to carry crude petroleum and have on board all certificates necessary to perform the charter service, and
(2) Golden Fleece warranted the speed and performance of the ship during the contract period. Disputes
arose in England between ST Shipping and Golden Fleece relating to alleged violations of these clauses.
On December 4, 2003, the International Maritime Organization issued new regulations which
required changes to the MIT ELLI. Despite the need for modifications, Golden Fleece assured ST
Shipping that the MIT ELLI fit within an exception to the new regulations and was in compliance. After
the termination of a subcharter agreement due to alleged non-compliance, ST Shipping brought a claim
against Golden Fleece in a London court.
On May 1 1 , 2007, ST Shipping requested, and was granted, an ex parte attachment of Golden
Fleece's assets in the Southern District of New York, seeking security for the claims pending in the
London court. However, before ST Shipping attached any of Golden Fleece's assets, the London court
rendered a judgment mandating payment by Golden Fleece to ST Shipping by August 20, 2007. As
payment was made on August 22, 2007, ST Shipping filed a notice of dismissal of the attachment action
in accordance with Rule 4 1 (a)( 1 ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of the Court,
however, did not formally close the case until May 9, 2008, when the District Judge endorsed the notice
of dismissal.
On March 1 5, 2007, ST Shipping gave notice to Golden Fleece of a separate claim for breach of
the speed and performance clause. On October 1 0, 2007, ST Shipping made a demand for $200,000 in
security, which Golden Fleece refused. On the same day, Golden Fleece began discussions regarding the
sale of the MIT ELL I. The sale of the ship was initiated on October 26, 2007. In the side letter
accompanying the memorandum of agreement to sell the MIT ELLI, the buyer was articulated as,
"Blanca Ship Management Company of [the] Marshall Islands or another company TBN." Although
closing and delivery did not occur until March 1 7, 2008, the effective date of transfers to the buyer of all
payments of hire made by charterers, claims, losses, and damages of the ship was deemed to be
December 1 5, 2007.
On December 1 1 , 2007, ST Shipping filed a motion requesting maritime attachment of Golden
Fleece's assets as security for the speed and performance claims pending in London. ST Shipping failed
to indicate on the civil cover sheet that the case was related to "a civil case pending . . . in S.D.N.Y." In
fact, ST Shipping's attorney stated in its affidavit that it was the first request for such relief to any court.
On December 28, 2007, the court authorized an ex parte order of maritime attachment.
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Subsequent to the attachment order, Citibank restrained three electronic funds transfers ("EFTs")
naming Golden Fleece as their beneficiary. These three payments were made by a company in exchange
for the charter of the MIT ELLI after the December 1 5, 2007.
As a result of this restraint of funds, Golden Fleece and Blanca Ship Management Co. ("Blanca")
moved to vacate the attachment on two grounds. First, they argue that the attached funds were not
property of Golden Fleece as they were held in trust or, in the alternative, had been assigned to Blanca.
Second, the two movants asserted that the attachment should be vacated on equitable grounds as ST
Shipping allegedly made false representations in the attorney's affidavit in support of the attachment and
also failed to file the action as a related case.
Under Supplemental Rules B and E of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in accordance
with the Second Circuit decision in Aqua Stoli Shipping, Ltd. v. Garnder Smith Pty, Ltd. , 1 the plaintiff
carries the burden of satisfying the elements of attachment. There must be a, "valid prima facie
admiralty claim against the defendant; . . . the defendant cannot be found within the district; . . . the
defendant's property may be found within the district; and . . . there is no statutory or maritime law bar to
the attachment."2 While there only need be a prima facie showing of a claim against the defendant, the
last three jurisdictional elements require proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
The only issue before the court was whether the seized assets, the EFTs, were Golden Fleece's
assets. The other requirements for attachment were satisfied. Examining the trust and assignment
assertions in light of English law / the court held that Golden Fleece did not establish the elements
required for either a trust on behalf of, or an equitable assignment of the assets to, Blanca.
English law requires four factors to be evinced with reasonable certainty: "intent to create a trust
with property intended to be kept separate from the trustee's personal property, trust property, intended
beneficiaries, and a trust purpose." Although the side letter evinces intent for Blanca to receive
payments after December 1 5, 2007, the court found the absence of basic trust terminology in an
otherwise sophisticated agreement provided strong evidence of a lacking intent to create a trust.
Additionally, the court cited the lack of sufficient certainty as to whether Blanca was even the
beneficiary of the alleged trust. The court found that the articulation of, "Blanca . . . or another company
TBN" in the side letter provided no indication of who could name the alternative beneficiary and thus,
who could even be an alternative beneficiary.
English law regarding an equitable assignment requires an absolute arrangement to be in writing
under the hand of the assignor. Although it found such an assignment present in the agreement between
Blanca and Golden Fleece, the court held that since the assignment in consideration of the sale of the
sole ship in a maritime corporation did not occur within the ordinary course of business, the agreement
would not protect Golden Fleece. The court reasoned that if the sale of the only ship owned by a
maritime corporation was found to be a transaction in the ordinary course of business, companies would,
"simultaneously rid[] [themselves] of assets from which creditors could seek satisfaction . . . rendering
the corporation judgment proof."
Because the assets were not property of Blanca, but rather of Golden Fleece, the court found the
Aqua Stoli factors fulfilled and thus, denied the motion to vacate for failure to meet the requirements for
attachment.
The court then addressed the equitable vacatur argument and held that ST Shipping did not
mislead the court by not indicating that the action was related to another pending civil case. The court
found there to be no evidence proving the elements required to grant an equitable vacatur. 4 Citing the
460 F.3d 434 (2d Cir. 2006),
Id.
3 The application cif English law was undisputed by the parties.
4 The court established that an equitable vacatur may be issued if the defendant demonstrates that "1) the defendant is subject
to suit in a convenient adjacent jurisdiction; 2) the plaintiff could obtain in personam jurisdiction over the defendant in the
I
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Rule 4 1 (a)(l ) dismissal on August 22, 2007, the court held both that the later endorsement by the judge
had no bearing on the legal status of the closed case and the fact that the action stemmed from a case
relating to the same charter was irrelevant. Therefore, the court denied the motion to vacate on equitable
grounds.
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district where the plaintiff is located; or 3) the plaintiff has already obtained sufficient security for the potential judgment, by
attachment or otherwise."
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